Operational risk is currently receiving significant media attention, as financial scandals have appeared regularly and multiple events have exceeded one billion dollars in impact. Regulators have also been devoting attention to this risk and are finalizing proposals that would require banks to hold capital for potential operational losses. This paper uses newly available loss data to model operational risk at internationally active banks. Our results suggest that the amount of capital held for operational risk will often exceed capital held for market risk and that the largest banks could choose to allocate several billion dollars in capital to operational risk.
employment practices.
1 Across all event types, more than 100 operational losses exceeding $100 million have impacted financial firms over the past decade.
While operational losses have traditionally been treated as idiosyncratic breakdowns in controls, financial institutions are increasingly viewing them as a homogeneous risk category that can be both managed and measured. Many large banks have begun collecting data on their own loss experience and are measuring their operational risk exposure based on these data. Most have a limited time series, however, and sparse data on large losses is a common modeling challenge. To address this problem of data sparseness at the individual bank level, this paper considers two commercial databases that catalog publicly disclosed operational losses across the entire financial services sector. We also propose a statistical technique to correct for the reporting bias inherent in such data. Our results suggest that many banks' operational risk exposures exceed their market risk exposures and that the largest banks could choose to allocate several billion dollars in capital to operational risk.
The importance of understanding and measuring operational risk is heightened by the fact that an operational event's impact frequently extends well beyond the bank where the loss occurred. Taxpayers may be affected if the loss occurs at an FDICinsured institution. For example, improper accounting at Superior Bank and internal fraud at the First National Bank of Keystone resulted in losses to the insurance fund of $500 million and $800 million, respectively. Customers may be affected if the operational event involves deceptive sales practices or a breach of fiduciary duty. Such was the case when Prudential Securities paid $1.3 billion to settle a lawsuit alleging that it had misrepresented the risk of oil and gas partnerships sold to 360,000 individual investors. Finally, the stability of the financial system may be affected if the loss occurs at a systemically important institution. In 1983, the failure of Drysdale Securities forced Chase Manhattan Bank to incur a $285 million loss to avert a widespread liquidity crisis.
Operational events can also have consequences beyond their direct financial impact. For example, an operational event may damage a firm's reputation if it is seen as an indicator of weak controls or ethical lapses. This appears to have been the case when shares of Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase fell by more than 15% following congressional hearings detailing the extent of the banks' involvement in the Enron affair.
2 If poor governance prevents management from addressing the loss's underlying causes, further financial and reputational losses can cumulate until they impact the solvency of the firm. A prime example of this link between operational risk, governance, and reputation is given by Credit Lyonnais, whose position as a leading French bank was gradually eroded over the 1990s as poor governance led to a long series of operational mishaps. By the end of the decade, the French government had spent more than FFr 100 billion on a series of bailouts. The bank was finally acquired by its rival Credit Agricole in 2003.
The frequency of large operational losses, their widespread impact, and their reputational consequences highlight the importance of measuring, monitoring, and mitigating operational risk, as well as holding sufficient capital for unexpected losses. However, there has been little published research regarding such questions as how operational risk might be quantified, or whether operational losses even constitute a material risk to the typical financial institution. To address these questions, we examine new databases that use public sources such as newspapers and press releases to catalog the industry's operational loss experience. After correcting for the reporting bias inherent in such "external" data, we obtain results that are consistent with the 3-6 billion dollars in capital which some large internationally active banks are allocating for operational risk. 3 The results are also consistent with a recent survey by the Basel Committee's Risk Management Group that found banks allocated, on average, approximately 15% of their capital for operational risk.
External data are also interesting in their own right. Banks' recent efforts to quantify operational risk have focused on their own loss experience, and many large banks have already started to capture such "internal" loss data. However, most have a very limited time series, so that data on large losses are quite sparse. The data are even sparser when disaggregated to the business line level. Data sparseness is a particular problem if the size distribution of operational losses is heavy-tailed (as it appears from our results), as it is difficult to estimate the tails of such distributions using small data sets (McNeil and Saladin 1997) . Many banks are aware that internal loss data may not be sufficient to obtain precise estimates of their operational risk exposure and believe that external data could serve as a useful supplement. However, they have been concerned with the reporting bias inherent in external data, an issue directly addressed in this paper. 4 External data will also allow regulators, rating agencies, and shareholders to compare a bank's operational risk exposure to that of its peers. Such benchmarking is also important for the bank's managers and board of directors, as they have been required to accept more responsibility for the financial controls in their company. While boards of directors may be able to observe capital held for operational risk at peer institutions, they are still confronted with the problem of whether differences in capital stem from incomplete data collection, differences in statistical models, or differences in loss experience. For example, a peer institution's high level of operational risk capital could result from very conservative modeling assumptions, or alternatively, from very large operational losses. External data provide a mechanism to evaluate peer banks' actual loss experience and thus increase the comfort a board can take with the integrity of its current controls and internal loss data.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, while some have questioned the need for explicit capital requirements for operational risk, our estimates indicate that operational losses are a significant source of risk for banks. We use external loss data to calculate the severity of losses, large bank experience to estimate the frequency of losses, and Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the distribution of total annual losses for a typical large bank. The results indicate that the capital charge for operational risk will often exceed the charge for market risk.
5 Second, we find that reporting bias in external data is significant and that losses as large as $100 million may not be publicly disclosed. Properly accounting for this bias-using techniques such as those presented here-will be crucial in obtaining credible estimates of operational risk capital. Third, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the loss severity distribution is the same across the 10 firms with the greatest number of losses in the external databases. So, while the frequency of losses (and thus total operational risk exposure) may vary, the severity of losses appears similar across large financial institutions. Although these last results are based upon a small sample size, they do suggest that results from external data may be applied to individual firms both for the purpose of supplementing internal loss data and for the purpose of benchmarking against industry experience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of operational risk and its relationship to market and credit risk. Section 2 provides descriptive statistics for the operational losses reported in external databases. Section 3 outlines the estimation techniques used to correct for reporting bias and to extract the underlying distribution of operational losses. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 considers the implications of our findings for regulatory capital, and the final section provides some conclusions.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL RISK
Neither operational risk nor the need to manage it is new. However, banks' increasing size and complexity have made them more reliant on management information systems that require accurate measurement of all risks, including operational 5. Hirtle (2003) reports the market risk capital requirement for top U.S. banking organizations (by assets) as of December 2001. The top three banks reported market risk capital between 1.9 and 2.5 billion dollars. These figures are of the same order of magnitude as the operational risk capital estimates reported in Section 5. The other 16 banks in Hirtle's sample reported market risk capital between 1 and 370 million dollars. Our results suggest that operational risk capital for most of these banks could significantly exceed this range.
risk. 6 The introduction of economic capital models (ECMs) and enterprise wide risk management over the last decade has further altered how large banks manage operational risk. ECMs serve two main functions within a financial institution. First, they enable senior management and boards of directors to evaluate risk on an aggregated basis for the firm. The board can then determine whether the firm's risk exposure is commensurate with its risk appetite and whether the firm's economic capital position provides a sufficient cushion against the risks to which it is exposed. Second, ECMs allow management to compare the financial performance of different business units on a risk-adjusted basis. The ability to do so is crucial not only for investment and compensation decisions (James 1996) but also for optimizing the deployment of scarce risk management resources.
Economic capital models have encouraged banks to measure all significant risks to the firm and to place a greater reliance on accurately quantifying operational risk. To do so, banks have generally adopted the operational risk definition used in the Basel II proposal, which is "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events." 7 This definition covers legal risk, a significant type of risk arising from "exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions, as well as private settlements." It is also worth noting that the term "loss" in the above definition refers only to those losses that have a discrete and measurable financial impact on the firm. Thus, strategic and reputational risks are excluded because they would not typically result in a discrete financial loss. To further understand what operational risk is, it is useful to consider the standard "Event Types" provided by the Basel Committee, as well as some actual losses that have occurred in each Event Type. This information is provided in Appendix 2.
Many banks are using what is known as the "Loss Distribution Approach," or LDA, to measure their operational risk exposures. 8 An LDA model consists of three 6. While this paper focuses on operational risk, market and credit risk are also important components of any economic capital model. Market risk was the first area to migrate risk management practices directly into the regulatory process. The 1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accord used value at risk (VaR) models to determine market risk capital for large complex banks, and most large financial institutions now use such models to measure and manage their market risk exposures. Duffie and Pan (1997) provide an overview of value at risk modeling techniques, and numerous other papers evaluate the empirical performance of VaR models (e.g., Hendricks 1996 , Pritsker 1997 . However, research concerning how well these models perform in practice has been limited by the proprietary nature of both the models and the underlying trading book data. Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) were able to obtain value at risk forecasts employed by commercial banks, but concluded value at risk models were not particularly accurate measures of portfolio risk. Regulators are now increasing the emphasis given to credit risk modeling, with the new Basel proposal taking a more risk sensitive and granular approach to credit risk. Concerns that greater risk sensitivity will also make capital more procyclical have drawn academic attention to this area (Catarineu-Rabell et. al. 2002 , Jordan et. al. 2003 . But while this proposal is intended to capture the best practices at major commercial banks, academic research has again been handicapped by the proprietary nature of the data and models. As a result, most studies of credit risk have examined proxies for a bank's actual credit risk exposure (Carey 1998). 7. Prior to the Basel II proposal, there were often different definitions of operational loss across banks and even across departments within a bank. With this standardization, developing loss data across the entire bank and aggregating these losses were greatly facilitated. In addition, using this common definition has aided in the construction of external loss data that are consistent with the definition being used in the collection of internal loss data.
8. For further discussion of the LDA, readers should refer to Klugman et al. (1998) and Embrechts et al. (2002) . basic components. First, a loss frequency distribution p(N t ) is used to model the number of losses N t that may occur within a given time period t (usually one year). Second, a loss severity distribution f (X i,t ) is used to model the dollar amount of the individual losses X i,t that occur during period t. Third, an aggregate loss distribution is used to model the aggregate loss amount L t that a firm will experience over the chosen horizon. The aggregate loss amount can be expressed as
The aggregate loss distribution is obtained from the frequency and severity distributions using Monte Carlo Simulation or an equivalent technique.
To implement an LDA, a bank needs to estimate the frequency and severity distributions. In principle, this can be done using the bank's own loss experience, or so-called "internal" loss data. Some banks have collected data from the general ledger or from other pre-existing sources for this purpose. Others have implemented new systems specifically designed for collecting and warehousing operational loss data. By now, many banks have several years of comprehensive loss data (Risk Management Group 2003) . Using these data, most banks try to estimate separate frequency and severity models for each of their material business lines and event types, and then aggregate the results to arrive at a firm-wide operational risk exposure.
However, most banks' internal loss data cover only a short time period, and thus contain few really large operational losses. The problem is especially acute for certain business lines (e.g., payment and settlement) and event types (e.g., business disruption and system failure) where few firms have experienced significant losses in recent years. To address this problem of data sparseness, the current Basel proposal requires banks to supplement internal data with external data and scenario analysis.
There are two broad approaches banks are taking to the use of external data. The first is a quantitative approach, whereby external loss data are used as a direct input to statistical models. For example, staff at Bank of America and Citigroup use external data to estimate operational risk exposure for those loss types where there are few (or no) large losses in the internal data.
9 They attempt to correct for reporting bias and cross-bank differences in control environment using a technique called "relative relationships." 10 Other banks that have taken the quantitative approach to 9. This description of Bank of America's approach is drawn from a presentation entitled "Implementing a Comprehensive LDA," dated May 29, 2003, which was given at the "Leading Edge Issues in Operational Risk Measurement" conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Presentations from this conference are available at: http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/events/banking/2003/ con052903.html. Citigroup staff's approach to external loss data is described in a presentation entitled "Implementing a Loss Distribution Approach." The presentation was given at ICBI's "Risk Capital '04" conference, which occurred on June 23-24, 2004. 10. Practitioners have developed the relative relationships technique in order to correct external data for reporting bias and cross-bank differences in control environment. The technique assumes that internal and external loss data can both be modeled with the same type of loss severity distribution (e.g., lognormal) and that the relationship between parameters for internal and external data is fixed across different business lines and event types. For example, suppose that for external fraud, internal and external data sources both provide numerous loss observations. The bank determines that the internal data follow a lognormal distribution with parameters µ ef,i ϭ 1 and σ ef,i ϭ 1 and that the external data follow a lognormal distribution with µ ef,e ϭ 3 and σef,e ϭ 2. Suppose further that for internal fraud, there is plentiful external data but no internal data. The bank determines that the external data follow a lognormal distribution with parameters µ if,e ϭ 6 and σ if,e ϭ 3. Then, the relative relationships technique would imply that the internal data follow a lognormal distribution with µ if,i ϭ µ if,e × (µ ef,i րµ ef,e ) ϭ 2 and σ if,i ϭ σ if,e × (σ ef,i րσ ef,e ) ϭ 1.5. the use of external data include Swedish bank SEB and the Italian banks Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI.
11
The second approach is more qualitative, where banks use external data as an input to focused discussions among their risk management and business line experts. An example is provided by J.P. Morgan Chase, whose business managers are asked to assess the frequency of large losses over a one-year time period. 12 The managers are given external data for their business line to stimulate their thinking about possible large losses. (One imagines that if a particular type of large loss has occurred at multiple institutions over the past decade, it would be difficult for a manager to claim that such a loss would be a 1 in 1000 year occurrence at her own business.) Other firms have chosen to supplement internal data with scenario analysis, which often utilizes external data as one source of possible scenarios.
13
Given the widespread usage of external data, it is critical to understand the potential pitfalls in using such data and how these pitfalls may be overcome. Two critical questions need to be addressed. First, are firms with few large losses in their internal data likely to obtain plausible results if they rely on external data to estimate the tail of the severity distribution (which accounts for most of the operational risk capital)? Second, how best to consider the underreporting that occurs in databases that rely primarily on public sources? . Both vendors gather information on operational losses exceeding $1 million from public sources such as news reports, court filings, and SEC filings. Several filters are applied to the raw data to ensure that losses included in the analysis occurred at financial services firms and that the reported loss amounts are reliable. All dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2002 level of the Consumer Price Index. Additional information regarding the construction of the data sets is provided in the Appendix.
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for losses that occurred in the United States. The table reports the distribution of losses across business lines, as well as the size of the loss in each business line at the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles. The two databases are remarkably similar at the aggregate level. In fact, the 50th percentile 11. The presentation entitled "Operational Risk Management: Aligning Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches" discusses Banca Intesa's use of external loss data. That presentation was given at Risk Magazine's "OpRisk USA" conference, which occurred on March 30 and 31, 2004. SEB and Sanpaolo discussed their use of external data in presentations at the New York Fed conference mentioned in Note 9.
12. See the presentation entitled "Leveraging Scenario Analysis in Operational Risk Management," which was given at the New York Fed conference mentioned in Note 9.
13. A group of European financial institutions has drafted a paper entitled "Scenario-Based AMA," which provides an overview of scenario analysis and discusses the use of external data to generate scenarios. The paper was presented at the New York Fed conference mentioned in Note 9. The exact number of losses in each data set has been omitted at the data vendors' request. However, we are able to report that each data set contains between one and two thousand observations meeting the filtering criteria discussed in the Appendix. The raw, unfiltered databases contain between six and nine thousand observations each.
loss ($6 million) and the 75th percentile loss ($17 million) are the same in both. The two databases are also similar at the business line level. The business line with the most observations in both is retail banking, which accounts for 38% of all OpRisk losses and 39% of all OpVar losses. While retail banking has the largest number of losses, these losses tend to be smaller than in other business lines. In contrast, trading and sales has fewer observations but has the largest loss by business line at the 95th percentile. These results suggest that it will be important to capture both frequency and severity in determining appropriate capital by business line. The table also reports results of the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine whether the distribution of losses differs across business lines (within the same database), as well as the Wilcoxon test to determine whether the distribution of losses differs across databases (within the same business line).
14 These tests confirm that the 14. The Kruskal-Wallis statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of losses is identical across business lines, versus the alternative that losses in at least one business line tend to be greater than losses in other business lines. The Wilcoxon statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of losses is identical across the two databases, versus the alternative that losses in one database tend to be greater than losses in the other.
cross-business line variation suggested by Table 1 is statistically significant and that there is no significant variation between the databases, either at the aggregate level or at the business line level.
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for losses that occurred outside the United States. The most striking result is that non-U.S. losses are significantly larger than U.S. losses. At both the aggregate and business line level, the reported percentiles for the non-U.S. losses are approximately double the equivalent percentiles for U.S. losses. In results not reported, Wilcoxon tests confirmed that the apparent differences between the distribution of U.S. losses and that of non-U.S. losses are statistically significant at the 1% level. This result holds both at the aggregate level and for individual business lines. We conclude that data collection processes may differ for U.S. versus non-U.S. losses and that the underlying loss distributions may also differ. We thus restrict our attention to losses that occurred in the U.S. This is not much of a concession, as more than two thirds of reported losses occurred in the U.S., and our primary interest at this time is in U.S.-based banks. Table 2 provides the same descriptive statistics classified by loss event type. The event types with the most losses are Internal Fraud and Clients, Products, and Business Practices. Those with the fewest losses are Damage to Physical Assets and Business Disruption and System Failures. The infrequency of these loss types may be an accurate reflection of their rarity. However, it could be that these types of losses are rarely disclosed, that loss amounts are not disclosed even if the event is disclosed, or that they are often misclassified under different loss types. It is also worth noting that while the losses at the 95th percentile are similar across the two databases overall, for particular event types such as internal fraud, the losses at the 95th percentile are quite different. Since the databases draw from similar news sources, this discrepancy could reflect the difficulty in classifying losses by event type.
In Table 3 , we investigate whether the distribution of reported losses varies across individual firms. To do so, we identified the 10 firms in each data set reporting the most losses. Not surprisingly, all of these firms are large, with the smallest having approximately $200 billion in assets as of December 2002. The table reports the 25th, 50th, and 75th loss percentiles for each firm, together with results of the KruskalWallis test for cross-firm differences in the distribution of losses. 15 The probability values for this test exceed 10%, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of losses is the same across large firms. This finding becomes important in Section 5, where we consider the appropriateness of using external loss data to model the loss severity distribution faced by individual firms.
This result is also somewhat surprising, as one might expect cross-firm variation in business line risk exposure and in the quality of internal controls to result in significant cross-firm variation in the loss severity distribution. However, the 15. In results not reported, we also conducted F tests for cross-firm differences in mean and χ 2 tests for cross-firm differences in median. The probability values for these additional tests all exceed 10%, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the loss severity distribution is the same across firms. a The exact number of losses in each data set has been omitted at the data vendors' request. However, we are able to report that each data set contains between one and two thousand observations meeting the filtering criteria discussed in the Appendix. The raw, unfiltered databases contain between six and nine thousand observations each.
result does not imply that all firms have identical operational risk exposures or that internal controls do not matter. The result applies only to large firms, and it is possible that the loss severity distribution varies with firm size. (This possibility is explicitly considered in Section 4.3.) Furthermore, the results apply only to the loss severity distribution, whereas both the frequency and the severity of operational losses determine a firm's operational risk exposure. It is possible that the quality of a firm's internal controls affects its operational risk exposure primarily through the loss frequency distribution rather than through the loss severity distribution. We also note that the number of observations for any one firm in Table 3 is limited, so the usual cautions associated with small sample size apply.
METHODOLOGY
Measuring operational risk from publicly available data poses several challenges, the most significant being that not all losses are publicly reported. One would also Tables 1 and 2 that occurred at each of the 10 firms. Although the exact number of losses in each data set has been omitted at the data vendors' request, one can infer from information reported in Table 1 that the number of losses for each firm ranges between 10 (1% 1,000) and 80 (4% 2,000).
expect a positive relationship to exist between the loss amount and the probability that the loss is reported. If this relationship does exist, then the data are not a random sample from the population of all operational losses but instead are a biased sample containing a disproportionate number of very large losses. Standard statistical inferences based on such samples can yield biased parameter estimates. In the present case, the disproportionate number of large losses could lead to an estimate that overstates a bank's exposure to operational risk. Another way of describing this sampling problem is to say that an operational loss is publicly reported only if it exceeds some unobserved truncation point.
16
Because the truncation point is unobserved, it is a random variable to the econometrician, and the resulting statistical framework is known as a random-or stochastictruncation model. Techniques for analyzing randomly truncated data are reviewed in Amemiya (1984) , Greene (1997) , Maddala (1983) , and many other sources. This section provides a brief overview of these techniques as they may be applied to operational loss data.
In related work, Baud et al. (2002) propose using a random truncation framework to model operational loss data and provide initial empirical results suggesting the feasibility of the approach. To our knowledge, however, the current paper is the first 16. We use the terms "threshold" and "truncation point" to describe two distinct features of the data collection process. The term "threshold" refers to the $1 million level below which losses are not reported in the external databases. The threshold is a known constant and is the same (in nominal terms) for each observation. The term "truncation point" refers to the unobserved, observation-specific random variable that determines whether a loss event is publicly reported and included in the external databases.
to apply such techniques to the new databases of publicly disclosed operational losses and is also the first to consider the implications of these data for the setting of operational risk capital.
Let x and y be random variables whose joint distribution is denoted j(x,y). The variable x is randomly truncated if it is observed only when it exceeds the unobserved truncation point y. If x and y are statistically independent, then the joint density j(x,y) equals the product of the marginal densities f (x) and g(y). Conditional on x being observed, this joint density can be written as
where G(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of y. Integrating out the unobserved variable y yields the marginal with respect to x:
The above expression denotes the distribution of the observed values of x and forms the basis for our estimation techniques.
As discussed previously, our data consist of a series of operational losses exceeding one million dollars in nominal value. Extreme value theory suggests that the distribution of losses exceeding such a high threshold can be approximated by a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD). To be more precise, let X denote a vector of operational loss amounts and set x ϭ X Ϫ u, where u denotes a threshold value. The PickandsBalkema-de Haan Theorem (page 158 of Embrechts et al. 1997) implies that the limiting distribution of x as u tends to infinity is given by
Which of the two cases holds depends on the underlying loss distribution. If it belongs to a heavy-tailed class of distributions (e.g., Burr, Cauchy, Loggamma, Pareto), then convergence is to the GPD with ξ Ͼ 0. If it belongs to a lighttailed class (e.g., Gamma, Lognormal, Normal, Weibull), then convergence is to the exponential distribution (ξ ϭ 0). Furthermore, it can be shown that if the underlying loss distribution belongs to either the heavy-tailed or the light-tailed class, then the distribution of log losses belongs to the light-tailed class of distributions. 17. See results 3.3.33 and 3.3.34 from Embrechts et al. (1997) . In results not reported, we also estimated the distribution of excess losses (rather than excess log losses) using a GPD distribution (rather than an exponential distribution). The resulting parameter estimates were very close to those reported in Table 4 .
That the exponential distribution has only one parameter makes it attractive for the current application. We thus model the natural logarithm of operational losses, and set f(x) in Equation (2) as
where x denotes the log of the reported loss amount X minus the log of the $1 million threshold. The above method for modeling the distribution of large losses is referred to as the "Peaks Over Threshold" approach and is discussed at greater length in Embrechts et al. (1997) .
To model the distribution of the truncation point y, we assume that whether or not a loss is captured in public disclosures depends on many random factors. These factors include: the location of the company and loss event; the type of loss; the business line involved; whether there are any legal proceedings related to the event; as well as the personal idiosyncrasies of the executives, reporters, and other individuals involved in the disclosure decision. In this case, a central limit argument suggests that y should be normally distributed. In practice, however, we find that the normality assumption results in frequent non-convergence of the numerical maximum likelihood iterations. Alternatively, we assume that the truncation point has a logistic distribution, so that
The Logistic distribution closely approximates the Normal distribution, but as noted in Greene (1997) , its fatter tails can make it more suitable than the Normal for certain applications. The logistic distribution seems more suitable for the current application as well, in that convergence issues are rare under this assumption. The logistic distribution has two parameters: the location parameter τ that indicates the (log) loss amount with a 50% chance of being reported; and a scale parameter β that regulates how quickly the probability of reporting increases (decreases) as the loss amount increases (decreases). The data consist of {x i ,z i } iϭ1to n , where x i denotes the natural logarithm of the reported loss amount minus the natural logarithm of the $1 million threshold value, and z i denotes the log of the inflation adjustment factor for the year in which event i occurred. 18 The likelihood equation is as follows:
Likelihood estimation based on Equation (6) underlies the results presented in the following section.
18. That is, z i equals the log of the CPI for 2002 minus the log of the CPI for the year in which event i occurred. Because the $1 million threshold is expressed in nominal terms, z i arises as the minimum possible value for x in the denominator of Equation (6).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Modeling Losses at the Bank-wide Level
The first and simplest model of the loss severity distribution restricts each parameter to be identical across business lines. This is denoted as "Model 1" in Table 4 . The estimate for the exponential parameter b is remarkably consistent across the two databases, with a value of 0.64 for the SAS OpRisk data and 0.66 for the Fitch OpVar data. Based on these estimates, one can infer that the loss severity distribution has finite mean but infinite variance, and is thus heavy-tailed. Nonetheless, our method of correcting for reporting bias does lead to a dramatic reduction in the estimated severity of operational losses: the 95th percentiles of the estimated loss distribution are approximately $7 million for both data sets, whereas the 95th percentiles of the raw data are $88 million for SAS OpRisk and $221 million for Fitch OpVar.
The parameters β and τ together determine the probability that a loss of a particular dollar amount is reported in the databases. Panels C and D report these probabilities for hypothetical losses of $10 million, $50 million, and $250 million. The results show that reporting bias is economically significant. For the SAS OpRisk data, a $50 million loss has only a 33% probability of being reported, while a $250 million loss has an 80% probability of being reported. The results are similar for the Fitch OpVar data. Reporting bias is also statistically significant. To demonstrate this, we estimated a restricted version of Model 1 where the reporting probability G(x) is constant across loss amounts and conducted a likelihood ratio test of this restriction in the usual manner. The probability values for this test, reported in the final column of Panels C and D, are less than 1% for both data sets.
There are several reasons that a particular loss may not appear in a database. First, the bank where the loss occurred may not have disclosed the loss-either because it did not deem the amount to be material or because the loss involved a confidential legal settlement. Second, the press may have decided that the loss was not noteworthy enough to justify a news article. Third, the external vendor's data collection process may not have located the news story reporting the loss. Finally, the reported loss amount may have been a rough estimate, in which case the loss would not have been included in our data sets (as discussed in the Appendix).
We use two methods to evaluate how well the model fits the observed loss data. First, we conduct Pearson's χ 2 goodness of fit test, which compares the expected and actual number of losses in a series of loss amount "bins." 19 The probability values for the test statistic (reported in the first lines of Panels C and D) are 37% for the OpRisk data and 46% for the OpVar data; these results suggest that the logitexponential model fits both data sets well. We also consider Quantile-Quantile plots, which compare the predicted quantiles of the fitted loss distributions with the actual 19. We calculated χ 2 goodness of fit tests because EDF-based tests can be sensitive to data rounding, which is common in these data sets. One can accommodate rounding within the χ 2 test by choosing bin values appropriately. quantiles of the empirical loss distributions. The plots reported in Figure 1 provide visual confirmation of the statistical fit tests, in that the actual and fitted quantiles are consistent. Both plots do show some deterioration in fit toward the tail of the loss distribution. One possible reason is that $1 million is too low a threshold for the Peaks Over Threshold approach, so that the GPD approximation does not fully capture the tail behavior of losses. We revisit the threshold selection issue later in the paper.
Business Line Effects
Our second model allows the parameters b, β, and τ to each vary by business line. This is denoted as "Model 2" in Table 4 . Goodness of fit test results for each business line are reported in Panels C and D. These results suggest that the logitexponential model provides a good fit for most business lines, as was the case when the model was fit on a cross-business line basis. Panels C and D also report tests of the restriction that the reporting probability G(x) is constant across loss amounts. This restriction is rejected at the 1% level for all business lines.
The estimates presented in Panels A and B of Table 4 suggest cross-business line variation in all three parameters. In addition, the two databases can imply different parameter values for the same business line. Such cross-database variation is not a problem for β and τ, as differences in the two databases' sampling techniques could plausibly lead to cross-database variation in these parameters. However, cross-database variation in b is potentially troubling, as both data sets should be sampling from the same underlying loss distribution. It is thus important to determine whether the cross-business line parameter variation is statistically significant. To do so, we note that Model 1 is a restricted version of Model 2 and use the log likelihood values reported in Table 4 to perform a likelihood ratio test in the usual manner. 20 The test statistics for both data sets exceed the 1% critical value, which indicates that the cross-business line variation in the observed loss distribution is statistically significant.
We now consider whether cross-business line variation in the observed loss distribution derives from variation in the underlying loss distribution or from variation in the distribution of the unobserved truncation variable (or both). To do so, we first estimate Model 3, in which b is held constant across business lines but β and τ remain unrestricted. Because Model 3 is a restricted version of Model 2, we can again use a likelihood ratio test to evaluate the hypothesis that b is constant across business lines. For both databases, the likelihood ratio test statistics are less than the 5% critical value. 21 Thus, we cannot reject the null that b is constant across business lines. Next, we estimate Model 4, a restricted version of Model 2 in which β and τ are held constant across business lines (but b is unrestricted). Here also, the likelihood test statistics for both databases are less than the 5% critical value. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β and τ are constant across business lines.
To summarize, we have found that while there is statistically significant crossbusiness line variation in the observed loss distribution, we cannot definitively attribute this finding to either variation in the severity parameter b or variation in the truncation parameters β and τ.
22 However, the results for Models 3 and 4 do resolve the issue of cross-database parameter variation. That is, cross-database parameter variation arose only in the context of Model 2. The likelihood ratio tests suggest that this model may be over-parameterized, in which case the apparent crossdatabase variation in results could be attributable to estimation error. Models 3 and 4, which have fewer free parameters, do not exhibit nearly as much cross-database parameter variation.
Firm Size Effects
In this section, we investigate the relationship between firm size and the severity distribution of operational losses. This is an important issue, as we are primarily interested in understanding the operational risk exposure of large banking organizations. The external databases report several measures of firm size, including assets, net income, and revenue. We focus here on the SAS OpRisk data and on assets for the 20. For example, let L 1 and L 2 denote the maximized log likelihood values for Models 1 and 2 estimated on the SAS OpRisk data. Then under the null that the three parameters are the same across business lines, the likelihood ratio test statistic 2(L 2 Ϫ L 1 ) ϭ 58.3 is distributed χ 2 (15). The 1% critical value of the χ 2 (15) distribution is 30.6.
21. For example, let L 2 and L 3 denote the maximized log likelihood values for Models 2 and 3 estimated on the SAS OpRisk data. Then under the null that b is the same across business lines, the test statistic 2(L 2 Ϫ L 3 ) ϭ 1.7 is distributed χ 2 (5). The 5% critical value of the χ 2 (5) distribution is 11.1.
22. The limited number of observations for most event types precludes a thorough analysis of how operational loss severity varies by event type. In results not reported, we considered the two event types with the most observations (Internal Fraud and Clients, Products and Business Practices) and found statistically significant variation in the observed loss distribution across Basel event types. As was the case with the cross-business line results presented in Table 3 , we could not definitively attribute this finding to either variation in the severity parameter b or variation in the truncation parameters β and τ. sake of brevity. Results are similar for the Fitch OpVar data and also when net income and revenue are used to measure firm size.
We begin by calculating the median value of firm assets over all losses, which is $54 billion. Losses are divided into three firm size classes: those for which firm assets are not reported, those for which firm assets are less than $54 billion, and those for which firm assets exceed $54 billion. These three classes account for 51%, 24%, and 24% of all losses, respectively.
23 Following the analysis of business line effects reported in Table 4 , we estimate four models for the relationship between firm size and the distribution of operational losses. Model 1 restricts b, β, and τ to be constant across firm size classes. Model 2 allows each parameter to vary across size classes. Model 3 restricts b to be constant across size classes, but allows β and τ to vary across classes. Model 4 allows b to vary across size classes, but restricts β and τ to be constant across classes.
We use the log likelihood values reported in Table 5 to test the restrictions embedded in Models 1, 3, and 4. The likelihood ratio tests indicate that neither Model 3 nor Model 4 can be rejected against Model 2 at the 5% level. However, Model 1 is rejected against Model 2 and also against Models 3 and 4. These results indicate that there is significant variation in the observed loss distribution across firm size classes but that this variation cannot be definitively attributed to either variation in the severity parameter b or variation in the truncation parameters β and τ. It is also worth noting that although the likelihood ratio tests do not suggest a clear choice between Model 3 and Model 4, the parameter estimates for each appear plausible. The results for Model 3 indicate that the likelihood of a loss of a given size being reported is lower (i.e., τ is larger) at large firms than at small firms. Those for Model 4 indicate that the loss severity distribution is heavier-tailed (i.e., b is larger) at large firms than at small firms.
In Section 5, we consider the implications of our findings for the level of capital that large banks might be expected to hold. To do so, we assume a baseline value of 0.65 for the parameter b. This value is consistent with estimation results for Model 2, which allows for the most general (unrestricted) specification of size effects. Although Models 3 and 4 are also consistent with the data, the results are inconclusive as to which of these models is more appropriate, and we have no a priori reason for restricting either the true loss severity distribution or the reporting probability G(·) to be constant across firm size classes. We consider a range of parameter values in Section 5 to account for the uncertainty regarding the appropriate specification of size effects.
Time Variation in the Loss Severity Distribution
We have also considered whether the distribution of operational losses varies over time. To do so, we split the sample into losses settled prior to 1995, and 23. SAS OpRisk obtained firm financial data (e.g., assets) primarily from Hoover's and Moody's. Inspection of the data suggests that it was difficult to obtain firm assets for losses that were settled before 1990, losses that occurred at very small firms, and losses that occurred at non-banks. Thus, losses with missing firm assets are not a random sample from all reported losses. However, this paper's primary interest is in current exposure faced by large U.S. banks. These institutions appear to be properly identified in the data. losses settled in 1995 and later years. 24 As with the analysis by firm size, we estimated a series of nested models to determine whether any of the parameters display significant variation across the two subsamples. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . The joint restriction that b, β, and τ are constant across subsamples cannot be rejected at the 5% level against any of the alternatives considered, which suggests that neither the loss severity distribution nor the truncation point distribution G(·) varies over time. 25 It thus seems appropriate to include losses from all years in estimating the loss severity distribution to which financial institutions are currently exposed.
24. We chose the two subsamples so they would have roughly equal numbers of observations. 25. A reasonable expectation would have been that operational loss severity has increased over time due to the increasing complexity of products offered by banks and of the environment in which they operate, and also due to a seeming increase in the number of large lawsuits involving financial institutions. In this regard, it is worth noting the findings of Boskin et al. (1996) , who report that the CPI overstates inflation by 0.8-1.6 percentage points. To the extent that this biases our results toward finding increases in operational loss severity over time, the failure to find evidence of such increases appears even more telling. 
Robustness to Alternate Threshold Choices
The results presented in Table 4 were derived using a Peaks Over Threshold methodology, in which losses exceeding a high threshold are assumed to follow a Generalized Pareto Distribution. It is well known that this methodology can be highly sensitive to the choice of threshold. The GPD is only an approximation, and parameter estimates resulting from one threshold could differ substantially from those resulting from another even higher threshold (for which the GPD is a better approximation).
To check the sensitivity of our results to threshold selection, we re-estimate the models using various thresholds between $2 million and $10 million. The results for Model 1 are reported in Table 6 . 26 Although the point estimates for b do vary somewhat according to the threshold, this variation does not appear statistically significant. Furthermore, there is no trend in the estimates as the threshold increases. Thus, the results suggest that the parameter estimates based on the original $1 million threshold are robust with respect to threshold selection.
SIMULATION RESULTS
This section considers the implications of our findings for regulatory capital at large internationally active banks. The empirical work in the previous sections focuses on the severity of large operational losses. However, capital requirements also depend on how frequently these losses are likely to occur. We base our capital analysis on the simple and commonly made assumption that the frequency of large losses follows a Poisson distribution. The Poisson assumption implies that the probability of a loss occurring does not depend on the time elapsed since the last 26. For the sake of compactness, we present these results only for Model 1. The results for models 2 to 4 also suggest that parameter estimates are robust with respect to threshold selection. loss, so that loss events tend to be evenly spaced over time. Some have suggested that the frequency of large operational losses does vary over time (Danielsson et al. 2001, Embrechts, Kaufmann, and Samorodnitsky 2002) . In this case, the Poisson assumption is not technically correct. However, we believe that time variation in the loss arrival rate should result in a fatter-tailed aggregate loss distribution, so that our current capital estimates would be conservative. A rigorous investigation of this issue is left to future research.
To calibrate the Poisson parameter, we first turn to the results of the 2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE), as publicly reported in a paper by the Risk Management Group (2003) . Table 6 of that paper reports that the 89 banks participating in the LDCE together reported 712 operational losses exceeding one million Euros. Table 1 suggests that over all loss amounts, five banks accounted for 30% of the losses. 27 If one assumes that all banks share the same loss severity distribution, then the top five banks should have a total of 214 losses exceeding $1 million, or 43 large losses per bank. It is also worth noting that only a minority of participating institutions supplied fully comprehensive data, so that the actual number of large losses at these five banks could well exceed 43.
The above calculation depends on a homogeneity assumption that may or may not hold in the underlying data. However, our informal discussions with banks confirm that a typical large internationally active bank experiences an average of 50-80 losses above $1 million per year. Smaller banks and banks specializing in less risky business lines could encounter significantly fewer losses in excess of $1 million, and extremely large banks weighted toward more risky business lines could encounter more large losses. The frequency of large losses may also depend on the control environment at an individual institution. We thus consider a wide range of values for the Poisson parameter λ of between 30 and 100 losses in excess of $1 million per year.
We assume that the severity of losses exceeding $1 million follows the logexponential distribution that was estimated in previous sections, with a value of 0.65 for the b parameter. We put forth three arguments for viewing this parameter value as representative of large banking organizations' current operational risk exposures. First, b ϭ 0.65 is consistent with results from Table 4 where b is estimated across all business lines (Models 1 and 3). We thus are making the implicit assumption that the hypothetical bank is active in all business lines. This assumption seems reasonable, at least for large banking organizations. In fact, we have verified that the ten largest U.S. bank holding companies were each active across all eight Basel business lines as of March 2004. 28 Second, the firm size analysis presented in Table 5 suggested that a value of 0.65 for the severity parameter b is consistent with the experience of institutions whose assets exceed $54 billion. Third, Table 3 the severity distribution of reported losses does not vary significantly across ten large financial institutions. The number of observations for each individual bank was small, so that the usual caveats associated with small sample size apply. However, the result does suggest that cross-firm control differences do not have a large impact on the severity distribution of operational losses. The preceding paragraph argues that our results apply not only to an "average" large bank, but also to many individual large banks. Nonetheless, we wish to understand how they might apply to institutions with different business mixes and to institutions with different control environments. We also wish to account for the possibility (discussed in Section 4) that large banks face a different loss severity distribution than smaller banks. For this reason, we report results for b ϭ 0.55, which might apply to a retail bank with an above-average control environment. 29 We also report results for b ϭ 0.75, which might apply to an investment bank with a below-average control environment.
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Using the above range of frequency and severity assumptions, we simulate one million years' experience of losses exceeding $1 million. We then have an estimate of the aggregate loss distribution, where the aggregate loss is defined as the sum of all individual losses occurring over one year. Under the proposed Basel Accord, capital must equal or exceed the 99.9th percentile of the aggregate loss distribution.
Results for the 99.9th percentile are presented in Panel A of Table 7 . The capital for a bank with 60 events a year would range from $600 million for a b estimate of 0.55 to $4.0 billion for a b estimate of 0.75. For a bank with 80 events a year, the range increases to $700 million to $4.9 billion. For a very large bank with a 29. The results shown in Table 4 suggest that retail banking may have a lighter-tailed loss severity distribution than other business lines.
30. The typical investment bank would be concentrated in corporate finance and trading and sales. The results shown in Table 4 suggest that these business lines may have heavier-tailed severity distributions than other business lines.
poor control environment, 100 loss events with a b of 0.75 would result in capital of $6 billion. Panel B reports the effect of increasing the soundness standard to the 99.97th percent confidence level favored by some banks. For the previous example of a large bank with a poor control environment, capital more than doubles to $14.4 billion.
It is also worth noting that we have explicitly modeled the frequency and severity of individual losses exceeding $1 million. Thus, the figures reported in Table 7 should be interpreted as the amount of capital required to cover large losses. Additional capital would be required to cover losses below $1 million. 31 Although measuring the amount of additional capital in question is beyond the scope of this paper, results from 2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise suggest that the amount is not negligible. Banks have made significant progress over the past three years in measuring and managing operational risk. A key factor behind this progress has been the development and analysis of comprehensive internal operational risk data. These data, in conjunction with the more traditional operational risk focus on a firm's control environment, have enabled firms to develop improved statistical modeling of operational risk exposure. Despite improvements in internal operational risk data capture, many firms have been challenged to understand how to quantify high severity losses that have not occurred in their internal data but could potentially occur. Increasingly, firms are integrating operational loss experience from peer institutions to better understand risk exposure-both as an input to qualitative techniques such as risk assessments and benchmarking and as a direct input to statistical models. In fact, many major U.S. banks subscribe to external databases or participate in data consortiums and have made external data an important component of how they assess their operational risk exposure. This paper analyzes recently available databases of publicly disclosed operational losses. We find that because large losses are more often disclosed than small losses, these databases have a significant and unavoidable reporting bias. After correcting for this bias, we obtain robust and realistic estimates of operational risk. Our estimates 31. To see this point, write L(t) ϭ Α iϭ1,N(t) X i,t , where X i,t denotes an individual loss occurring in year t, N(t) denotes the number of losses in year t, and L(t) denotes the aggregate loss in year t. Letting 1(·) denote the indicator function, rewrite the previous equation as Table 6 of that paper reports that for a sample of 63 international banking organizations reporting operational losses above V10,000, 98.7% of reported losses were less than V1 million. In terms of the value of reported losses, losses under V1 million accounted for 29.3% of the total reported loss amount.
are consistent with the 3-6 billion dollars in capital which some large financial institutions are currently allocating for operational risk. Furthermore, we find that the operational losses reported by major banks display a surprising degree of statistical regularity and that large losses are well modeled by the same Pareto-type distribution seen in phenomena as disparate as city sizes, income distributions, and insurance claim amounts. 33 This regularity suggests that while the details and chronologies of the loss events may be idiosyncratic, the loss amounts themselves can be modeled and quantified in a meaningful manner.
We find that banks' exposure to operational risk is significant and that economic capital for operational risk will often exceed economic capital for market risk. This finding is consistent with the investment in quantification of operational risk that has been pursued at major banks and also explains why banks are beginning to report capital for operational risk in their 10-K filings. As institutions increasingly rely on sophisticated risk models to aid them during strategic and business decision-making processes, it will become increasingly important to incorporate the quantification of operational risk. The failure to do so could seriously distort RAROC models, compensation models, economic capital models, and investment models frequently used by financial institutions.
The extent to which operational risk should inform strategic decisions (e.g., which business lines to grow) ultimately depends on how much this risk can vary within a firm. The amount of intra-firm variation in operational risk depends on the answers to two open questions. First, to what extent does the frequency distribution of large losses vary across business lines? Second, are there dimensions other than business line that might be associated with intra-firm variation in operational risk? The magnitude of our estimates suggests that if the level of operational risk does vary within a firm, the impact on economic capital could be large. Thus, answering these two questions is an important area for future research.
Although much remains to be done, our findings do have several implications that are of immediate practical relevance. First, our analysis indicates that reporting biases in external data are significant and can vary by both business line and loss type. Failure to account for these biases could overstate the amount of operational risk that a bank faces and could also distort the relative riskiness of various business lines. More generally, the analysis indicates that external data can be an important supplement to banks' internal data. While many banks should have adequate data for modeling high frequency low severity operational losses, only a few will have sufficient internal data to estimate the tail properties of the very largest losses. Our results show that external data are an important part of the effort to understand the distribution of these large losses, an effort well underway at many major U.S. banks.
33. Vilfredo Pareto introduced the Pareto distribution to explain income distribution at the end of the nineteenth century. For discussions of how Pareto-like distributions apply to city sizes and insurance claim amounts, refer to Gabaix (1999) and Embrechts et al. (1997) . APPENDIX 1. THE VENDORS' DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES Both vendors search online news services such as Factiva and Lexis-Nexis using keywords associated with operational losses (e.g., "unauthorized," "fraud," "discrimination," "aggressive sales"). The search is limited to losses exceeding one million dollars, as it is felt that large losses are most relevant for understanding and estimating firms' operational risk exposures. The resulting losses are manually verified to ensure that they are truly operational and that the final loss amount and other necessary information are known with reasonable certainty. Losses are then classified by business line and event type, and additional information regarding firm size and industry is added to each observation. Although the vendors collect losses for both financial and non-financial firms, we restrict all our analyses to losses occurring at financial firms.
The above information sheds light on certain key features of the data, such as the timeframe and the firm population of which they are representative. Regarding the timeframe, an investigation of Factiva suggests that most major news sources are included as of some date in the 1980s. Regarding the population from which firms are drawn, all firms are in theory covered by major newspapers and newswires. However, foreign firms may not be as well covered as U.S. firms, as electronic archiving for foreign publications may be more recent than for U.S. publications, and the vendors may not possess the language skills required to monitor all foreign publications. Furthermore, media coverage of small firms may differ from that of large firms. We address these potential biases by excluding foreign firms (Tables 1  and 2 ) and by examining the relationship between firm size and the truncation point distribution (Table 5) 
